REACTIONS TO REPORT
Brig.-Gen. Peter Atkinson wasn't prepared to dismiss Wednesday's Senlis Council report as quickly as Defence Minister Mackay, who simply quipped that it was “not credible.”.
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The Brig.-Gen told the all-party defence committee: “There were a lot of issues brought up in the report, a very important report, one which NATO and Canada will read very carefully as we are looking at the future of the mission. ... It's probably too early to comment directly on what is in there. ... We're taking a hard look at it."
Bloc Quebecois defence critic Claude Bachand was outraged, saying his briefing contradicted not only the Senlis Council, but other aid agencies operating in the war-torn region.
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"He's trying to convince the committee through rose-coloured glasses that everything is going well, but things aren't going all that well," said Bachand, who began quoting passages of the Senlis report back to the general.
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"I could go on and on, Mr. Chairman, and it's completely opposite to what the general is telling us. I'm very disappointed in this situation."
NDP defence critic Dawn Black said none of the testimony she heard squares with anything she's been reading, including a recent report by Oxfam in Britain, which outlined a dire situation in many rural Afghan villages.
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"The evidence we're getting back from a number of different sources is that the security situation is worse, not better."
Almas Bawar Zakhilwal, the Ottawa-based manager of the Senlis Council's Canadian branch, says the Taliban are so confident they routinely set up night-time checkpoints on roads around Kandahar City.
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In his briefing for MPs, Atkinson noted that attempts by insurgents to "encircle Kandahar" have been defeated.
SOURCE
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SENLIS COUNCIL: Stumbling into chaos: Afghanistan on the brink
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (full text)
In September 2006, Senlis Afghanistan released a security assessment report detailing the return of the Taliban to Afghanistan, pointing to the increasing hold that the movement has on southern provinces.
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Some 14 months later, the security situation has reached crisis proportions. The Taliban has proven itself to be a truly resurgent force.
Its ability to establish a presence throughout the country is now proven beyond doubt; research undertaken by Senlis Afghanistan indicates that 54 per cent of Afghanistan’s landmass hosts a permanent Taliban presence, primarily in southern Afghanistan, and is subject to frequent hostile activity by the insurgency.
The insurgency now controls vast swaths of unchallenged territory including rural areas, some district centres, and important road arteries.
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The Taliban are the de facto governing authority in significant portions of territory in the south, and are starting to control parts of the local economy and key infrastructure such as roads and energy supply.
The insurgency also exercises a significant amount of psychological control, gaining more and more political legitimacy in the minds of the Afghan people who have a long history of shifting alliances and regime change.
The depressing conclusion is that, despite the vast injections of international capital flowing into the country, and a universal desire to ‘succeed’ in Afghanistan, the state is once again in serious danger of falling into the hands of the Taliban. Where implemented, international development and reconstruction efforts have been underfunded and failed to have a significant impact on local communities’ living conditions, or improve attitudes towards the Afghan Government and the international community.
The current insurgency, divided into a large poverty-driven ´grassroots´ component and a concentrated group of hardcore militant Islamists, is gaining momentum, further complicating the reconstruction and development process and effectively sabotaging NATO-ISAF’s stabilisation mission in the country.
Of particular concern is the apparent import of tactics perfected in Iraq. The emboldened Taliban insurgency is employing such asymmetric warfare tactics as suicide bombings and roadside bombs, causing numerous casualties both among the civilian population and the international and national security forces.
Increased lawlessness and lack of government control in the border areas with Pakistan are directly and indirectly fuelling the insurgency through the flow of new recruits, a stable financial and operational support base and ideological influence inspired by Al-Qaeda.
Senlis Recommendations
Senlis Development Recommendations
Senlis Executive Summary
REPORT SECTIONS
The United Nations Drug Conventions Regime and Policy Reform
International Drug Policy Status Quaestionis
Global Drug Policy: A Historical Perspective
Illicit drugs convention reform & the United Nations agencies
The United Nations Drug Control Treaties
A Fourth International Convention for Drug Policy
Feasibility Study on Opium Licensing in Afghanistan for the Production of Morphine and Other Essential Medicines
Impact Assessment of Crop Eradication in Afghanistan
Helmand at war
Afghanistan Insurgency Assessment Field Report
Integrated Social Control in Afghanistan
Kandahar Report
Global Drug Policy: Building a New Framework
Political History Poppy Licensing Turkey May 2006
Afghanistan Five Years Later - The Return of the Taliban
Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan
Launching a new campaign for the hearts and minds in Southern Afghanistan - Rusi Speech
Hearts and Minds Campaign in Southern Afghanistan
Countering The Insurgency In Afghanistan
Poppies for Peace Reforming Afghanistans Opium Industry
Knife Edge Report
War Zone Hospitals in Afghanistan: A Symbol of Wilful Neglect
India case study
Poppy for medicine project
Taliban politics and Afghan legitimate grievances
A lost mandate: The Public Calls for a New Direction in Afghan Counter-Narcotics Policies
CIDA Unanswered questions
Peace in Afghanistan - Made in Canada
Overview
Note: SOURCE
SENLIS COUNCIL: Stumb...
Senlis Recommendations
Senlis Development Reco...
Senlis Executive Summary
REPORT SECTIONS
