A Nuisance Neighbour

In the 1960s, Canada began to drastically reduce its military, which until then had always been at Britain's side, if not America's. Canada's NATO contribution, never large, faded to insignificant long before the Berlin Wall came down in November, 1989. It withdrew its soldiers and airmen from Europe entirely at the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, while continuing to cut its armed forces, Canada briefly sought an international reputation in peacekeeping, but greatly tempered this initiative after disastrous experiences in Somalia, where its troops misbehaved, and in Rwanda, where its leadership was ignored. Today, the Canadian military numbers about 60,000 and Canada spends only about 1% of GDP on "defence." The value of British ties faded with the decline in Britain's power and the rise of separatist sentiment in Quebec. The threat of being absorbed not by a conquering but by a thriving America was also real after the Second World War. Canada had to find an identity as something other than Britain's North American outpost. It has been building that identity ever since. In 1982, it brought home its Constitution from Britain and with it a new Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a Canadian version of the American Bill of Rights. But a constitution does not a country make, and Canada still has to worry about the big identity thief to the south. A Canadian idol has become a Canadian who succeeded in America. Many professional and industrial associations have blended between the nations, with the really big prizes almost always located in the south. Although very few Americans know or care who the prime minister of Canada is, most Canadians not only know the names of several American politicians, but have strong preferences among them. It is no wonder that Canada reveres its problem-laden health care system, because Canada is very close to being America with but one distinction -- universal health care. Canada's search for additional national distinction has led it to adopt an anti-American foreign policy. The Vietnam War coincided with attempts to solidify a non-British identity in Canada. Canadian abstention from the war made the harbouring of American draft avoiders possible, as did the division over the war in the United States. Canadian politicians learned that opposing American foreign policy was popular at home and carried little risk to Canada of American retaliation. When Canada helped some Americans to get out of Tehran during the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979, it bought a decade of American goodwill. The token dispatch of two warships and a squadron of fighter aircraft was enough to give it full credit during the first Gulf War in 1991. But being an American foreign policy opponent has more advantages than being an American partner. Without costs, many around the world shake a fist at America. The American public barely notices and holds few grudges. But opposing America can seem like standing up to Goliath at home. It can give the appearance of independence to nations that are hopelessly dependent. Low grade anti-Americanism on Canada's part is surely tolerable. It is probably the glue that holds Canada together, and Americans should want Canada to stick together. Otherwise, the U.S. might be paying for the Maritime provinces and trying to figure out what to do with Quebec. Moreover, anti-Americanism may well be the international norm these days given the disparities in power that exist and our own unilateralist tendencies. If it makes most Canadians, or perhaps just most Canadian officials, feel good about themselves for Canada to cultivate an image of the kinder, gentler, more nuanced North American country, then so what? Canada's refusal to support America's invasion of Iraq may be in this mode. Calls by Canada for the United States to give more time for inspections to work or to take no action without United Nations approval, may have been annoying to senior U.S. administration officials, but were understandable Canadian positions. Canada was not going to contribute anyway, and we were going to go ahead whether or not Canada agreed. No one much cared what Canada said or did. The more reprehensible Canadian behavior has been that which has potential for harmfully constraining our military actions and putting our soldiers permanently at risk. One example is the Ottawa Treaty Banning Landmines, which the Canadian Foreign Minister at the time, Lloyd Axworthy, orchestrated in 1997. The Treaty, whose formulation involved unusually extensive participation by non-governmental organizations including various humanitarian relief and anti-war groups, bans the manufacture, possession, transfer, and use of anti-personnel devices that explode on contact or in proximity with a person so as to incapacitate, injure or kill. Banned also are so-called anti-handling devices often used with anti-vehicle mines. The argument was that the dangers of mines persist long after wars, with these weapons lying in wait most often in unmarked or forgotten locations to kill and maim the innocent who pass by or try to work the land. http://www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/news/issuesideas/story.html?id=0426ecf8-ea82-4b86-ac93-74a7a1f218bd [Proofreader's note: this article was edited for spelling and typos on August 4, 2005]

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