Canada Requested Missile Defense Role In NORAD (One Year Ago)

"A key focus of our co-operation in missile defence should be through NORAD.... NORAD's long-standing global threat warning and attack assessment role can make an important contribution to the execution of the missile defence mission. We believe that our two nations should move on an expedited basis to amend the NORAD agreement to take into account NORAD's contribution to the missile defence mission. It is our intent to negotiate in the coming months a Missile Defence Framework Memorandum of Understanding with the United States with the objective of including Canada as a participant in the current U.S. missile defence program and expanding and enhancing information exchange. We believe this should provide a mutually beneficial framework to ensure the closest possible involvement and insight for Canada, both government and industry, in the U.S. missile defence program. Such an MOU could also help pave the way for increased overnment-to-government and industry-to-industry co-operation on missile defence that we should seek to foster between our countries. I propose that our staffs work together over the coming months to identify opportunities and mechanisms for such consultations and Canada's contributions.... We should continue to explore appropriate technical, political and financial arrangements related to the potential defence of Canada and the United States against missile attack, within the framework of our laws. Our staffs should discuss ways in which Canada could contribute to this effort."2 (Emphasis added) It is important to highlight the Canadian government's position that NORAD should be "a key focus" of Canada's "co-operation in missile defence." In particular, Canada wanted NORAD's "long-standing global threat warning and attack assessment role" to be used in "the execution of thenmissile defence mission." This, it turns out, is exactly what Canada's government achieved seven months later, in August 2004, upon successfully amending the NORAD treaty. Pratt's letter also reveals that Canadian government yearnings for increased "missile defense" responsibilities were not limited to a military-to-military role within NORAD. Although this alliance of the two countries' institutions of war is a logical structure within which this important Canada-U.S. partnership is growing, Pratt also said that Canada wanted "the closest possible involvement and insight for Canada, both government and industry, in the U.S. missile defence program." He then mentioned Canada's desire for "increased government-to-government and industry-to-industry co-operation on missile defence." This sense that Canada's intent was to enlarge upon already-existing avenues of bilateral cooperation on "missile defense," besides those conducted by their militaries, is also conveyed when Pratt says that Canada wanted to "continue to explore appropriate technical, political and financial arrangements" to assist the highly-contentious U.S.-led weapons development program. In his very brief, officious reply, Rumsfeld said: "I agree that we should seek to expand our cooperation in the area of missile defense."3 (Emphasis added) Rumsfeld's letter was deliberately worded to denote the obvious reality, also conveyed in Pratt's letter, that the two countries were already cooperating on "missile defense." Some seven months after the Pratt-Rumsfeld exchange, a considerable amount of heated public debate on "missile defense" had passed under the bridge in Canada. Despite strong, widespread public opposition to "missile defense," Canada's Ambassador Kergin requested in writing that the U.S. agree to the addition of "missile defense" warning functions to NORAD. This letter was, however, much cagier about the extent to which Canada and the U.S. were already partnered on "missile defense." Kergin phraseology tried to maintain the Liberal government's carefully-honed, public deceit that the process being initiated would merely mark the beginning of Canadian membership in the notorious U.S. weapons program. Kergin even tried his hand at rewriting history by pretending to quote from Pratt's letter to Rumsfeld in January. Kergin said: "I also make reference to the exchange of letters between...Pratt and...Rumsfeld on January 15, 2004, in which they stated that... our two Governments should explore extending our partnership to include cooperation in missile defence."4 (Emphasis added) In fact, as seen in quotations above, the January 15 letters clearly spoke of "increased...co-operation on missile defence" (Pratt) and "expand our cooperation in the area of missile defense" (Powell). Kergin then said, in typically-obscurantist bureaucratese, that: "our two governments agree that NORAD's aerospace warning mission for North America also shall include aerospace warning, as defined in NORAD's Terms of Reference, in support of the designated commands responsible for missile defence of North America."5 This legalistic statement, when translated into plain English, expresses Canada's agreement to partake in "missile defense" by expanding NORAD's crucial "aerospace warning" function. Then, in the very next sentence, Canada's ambassador to the U.S. writes an extremely abstruse line: "This decision is independent of any discussion on possible cooperation on missile defence."6 What? How are we to interpret such a barefaced, self-contradiction as this? Here we have a formal letter specifically designed to modify a major bilateral military treaty by adding "missile defense" functions to their joint efforts. And yet, although the entire purpose of Kergin's letter is therefore clearly intended to state Canada's commitment to participate in "missile defense," it simultaneously makes a totally incongruous assertion. At first glance, this sentence seems to be a caveat to convey the following meaning: "This does not mean that Canada has yet decided to cooperate with the U.S. on missile defense." Kergin's equivocal line was probably crafted for the sole purpose of confusing and deceiving Canadian opponents of the "missile defense" weapons program. It certainly helped. During the seven months since Pratt had crafted his relatively-forthright letter to Rumsfeld back in the early days of Martin's rule, the political climate had clearly changed. By the time Kergin was finalising the Canadian government's commitment to "missile defense" through NORAD, the Liberals had clearly decided that they should work harder to conceal the extent of their commitment to America's divisive "missile defense" program. However, if one reads Kergin's enigmatic line very carefully, using the corporate mindset of a government lawyer, it can be seen to be equivocal. It can easily carry another sense altogether. The addition of a few words makes its more-plausible meaning clear: "This decision is independent of any discussion on other possible areas of cooperation on missile defence." By this, Kergin was likely referring to the "increased government-to-government and industry-to-industry co-operation on missile defence that we should seek," that had been referred to in Pratt's earlier letter. However, regardless of Kergin's apparent attempt at obfuscation, at least Colin Powell knew exactly what the Liberal government was after. Powell responded immediately and affirmatively to Canada's offer to extend the NORAD agreement to include the crucial "aerospace warning" aspect of "missile de-fense." Powell replied by saying "the United States of America concurs with the provisions set out in your Note."7 By doing so, Kergin's amendment was incorporated into the NORAD treaty and "missile defense" responsibilities were immediately added to Canada's workload at NORAD. They Got What They Wanted Back in 1999, the Ottawa Citizen's "defence reporter," David Pugliese wrote: "The Canadian military wants to take part in a controversial U.S. plan to build a North American ballistic missile defence shield by contributing more than $600 million in space hardware [through the Joint Space Project]. Canadian Forces officials have been pushing for a role in the American national missile defence system since 1997, according to Access to Information documents obtained by the Citizen. Under the Canadian military plan its participation in the system would be deemed an 'asymmetrical' role, where Canada would not directly fund the American missile defence shield but provide a variety of space and ground equipment for surveillance and other jobs to support the North American Aerospace Defence Command."12 (Emphasis added) So, as it turned out, Canadian "missile defense" enthusiasts at DND eventually got almost everything they wanted. But, more importantly, their U.S. counterparts got what they wanted from Canada too. As noted by Dr. John Clearwater, a Canadian military historian and expert on Canada-U.S. relations with regards to nuclear weapons: "The clear and simple fact is that Paul Martin and the Liberals have already given the United States exactly what it sought to begin with - full co-operation by NORAD in missile-defence work.... NORAD was already... an integral part of the missile-defence structure. Since Canada already provides manpower for NORAD early-warning and battle-command posts at our expense, and as these are free gifts to operate the missile-defence program, there is no reason to think that Canada is getting a free ride. In fact, Washington gets the extra staffing without paying the bill."13 When President George W. Bush visited Canada in December 2004, he used three public fora to urge Canada to join America's expansive, weapons development program. This had the effect of driving home the illusion that Canada was not already on board. It also gave Martin the welcome opportunity to please voters by pretending to stand up to Bush. This is an age-old game. The American administration knows all-to-well that their allies sometimes have to feign opposition to U.S. policies in order to gain or retain domestic political support. Such oppositional play-acting does not, therefore, undermine U.S. goals. On the contrary, because duplicitous trickery of this variety can strengthen the domestic standing of one's closest friends, such fakery is tolerated and even encouraged. (See "The Pretense of Opposition.") McKenna's Bombshell: Canada Already Said "Yes" As Regehr has noted, because Canada had "already made the decision to cooperate with the U.S. on BMD"14 it was not clear what Bush was really asking for. Or, as Michael O'Hanlon, an analyst with America's conservative Brookings Institute expressed it, in early February 2005, it is "hard to see what more Bush wants."15 A few weeks later, on February 22, this recognition that Canada had already said "yes" was expressed once again, this time by Frank McKenna, Canada's newly appointed ambassador to the U.S. "We're part of it now," he said during a Parliamentary committee meeting on foreign affairs, "and the question is, what more do we need?"16 McKenna also commented that he could not fathom why, during Bush's recent visit to Canada, the president had repeatedly asked Martin to sign on to the "missile defense" program. When grilled by reporters on whether Canada really was already taking part in "missile defense," McKenna's near-sacrilegious statements seemed to astound the fourth estate. Journalists were flabbergasted. For years they had dutifully parroted the standard, government line that Canada was not sharing the "missile defense" burden. Now, they badgered McKenna to explain what he could possibly mean. McKenna tried to enlighten them by pointing to NORAD:"There's no doubt, in looking back, that the NORAD amendment [of August 5, 2004] has given, has created, part - in fact a great deal - of what the United States means in terms of being able to get the input for defensive weaponry." This latest NORAD amendment, he said: "allows our American partners in security in North America to obtain the threat assessments and the information they need to make decisions to deploy missiles or other forms of defence."17 McKenna was also quoted as saying: "I believe that we've given in large measure what the Americans want, which is the ability to use NORAD and their intercept information in order to be able to target weaponry."18 With regards to Bush demanding that Canada "sign on" to "missile defense," McKenna asked reporters: "What does 'sign on' mean?... You couldn't put it more bluntly than that."19 By focusing entirely on Canada's connection to "missile defense" through its NORAD obligations, McKenna's admissions actually served to cover up the many other ways in which Canada performs as a major, team player on "missile defense." However, McKenna was at least admitting one significant Canadian contribution to the project, and that is one more contribution than was generally being acknowledged by the media. In the context of almost complete and total denial that Canada was engaged in any way whatsoever, McKenna's innocent comments were like a profound admission of guilt, and they caused a media frenzy. The next day, McKenna's observations made front-page headlines and were the subject of lead stories on radio and TV broadcasts across the country. They triggered what the media repeatedly called an "uproar." The government must have been livid. McKenna's honesty was blowing their cover. His statements threatened to undermine the Liberals' ruse that they had not yet decided whether or not to take Canada down the road towards "missile defense." In response to the media swirl around McKenna's frank observations, the public, which is generally unsympathetic to Canadian involvement in multi-billion-dollar U.S. wars and weapons schemes, was truly shocked. After being bombarded with such a constant barrage of misstatements, disinform-ation and lies emanating from government officials intent on covering up Canada's hypocritical support for "missile defense" weapons programs, McKenna's admission seemed astounding. The day after McKenna had wondered aloud about what more the U.S. could want from Canada on "missile defense," Conservative Party MP, Rick Casson (Lethbridge, AB), like many Canadians, seemed genuinely surprised that this country was in any way engaged in this enterprise. Referring to the NORAD treaty as a "backdoor deal on missile defence," he raised McKenna's comments in the House of Commons and criticised the Liberals, saying they had "secretly agreed to take part in the missile defence system."20 In reality, the change to the NORAD-treaty had not been much of a a secret at all, although the media had been hoodwinked by Kergin's misleading caveat and therefore played down Canada's new "missile defense" duties. Nevertheless, Canada's NORAD-connection to "missile defense" was far enough out in the open that the McKenna story should not have caused the eruption of such a firestorm. Canada was, and clearly still is, in denial about its role in "missile defense." Perhaps the most dull-witted response to McKenna's blundering admission of reality, came from Stephen Harper. As leader of Canada's official opposition, the Conservative Party, which strongly supports the "missile defense" weapons program, Harper must have understood the significance of Canada's amendment to the NORAD treaty. However, he still indignantly cried out in Parliament: "How could this prime minister secretly make this decision, clearly breaking every commitment he's made to this House and to Canadians?"21 The shocked reactions to McKenna's statements exemplify what psychologists refer to as "cognitive dissonance." This is the phenomenon of mental discomfort that is experienced when there is a "discrepancy between what you already know or believe, and new information or interpretation. It therefore occurs when there is a need to accommodate new ideas."22 The discomfiting new idea that needed accommodating was that Canada was already implicated in so called "missile defense." However, the Liberal government clearly did not want this dissonant "uproar" to facilitate a transition into any such new public understanding. They needed a way to put McKenna's cat back into the bag. Within a few hours of Mc-Kenna's words hitting the news, there was a "leak" to the media. "It is a firm 'no,'" said one anonymous federal government official, but "I am not sure it is an indefinite 'no.''"23 The word thus seeped out that in a couple of days Martin would finally announce Canada's ultimate decision regarding involvement in "missile defense." These rumours had it that the government would say "no," and indeed it officially did, on February 24. His widely-publicised "no" was clearly timed as a means of damage control to deal with McKenna's blundering assertion about what should have been a simple and obvious truth. In effect, Martin's "no" was dealt out in order to trump McKenna's "yes." Liberal "No": A Toothless, Symbolic, Political Gesture Martin's purported "no" to "missile defense" was a symbolic gesture undertaken to garner public support for the Liberal's minority government. It was a token action; an example of the kind of unaccountable puff in political rhetoric that Canadian courts have ruled is completely non-binding. In assessing the significance of this "no," the following should be considered. Martin's public explanation of the government's alleged opposition to "missile defense" was brief, nondescript and contained no substantive details. There was no explanation of what this so-called "no" actually meant: * The Liberal government's "no" was not linked to any diplomatic exchange of notes with the U.S. * No Memoranda of Understanding governing Canada's ongoing participation in "missile defense" were changed or created. * No alterations were made to any Canada-U.S. agreements, such as the NORAD treaty, through which Canada is firmly embedded in "missile defense" efforts. * Neither was there a parliamentary committee meeting or any Act of Parliament to iron out the details. * No government edicts or decrees were issued to modify, in any way whatsoever, the progress of Canadian business deals that cement the two countries' efforts in the field of "missile defense" collaboration. * There does not even seem to have been a government media release issued to explain what the Liberal's illusory "no" really meant. So, although Martin's lips did mouth a verbal "no," his statement had absolutely no teeth. As far as Canadian corporations, government scientists and military personnel are concerned it is still business as usual with regards to the Canada-U.S. partnership on "missile defense." It is difficult to determine what, if anything, Martin's "no" actually did to tangibly affect bilateral relations on this matter. The government's symbolic "no" was not linked to any authentic, government effort to slow or halt, let alone reverse, Canada's existing commitments to "missile defense." It was Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew who formally declared, in the House of Commons, that Canada had say "no" to any Canada-U.S. alliance on "missile-defense" efforts. He said: "After careful consideration of the issue, we have decided that Canada will not participate in the U.S. ballistic missile defence system."24 And, apparently, it was Petti-grew who had first told the American government how Canada was going to handle the "missile defense" hot potato. Pettigrew is said to have spoken with Secretary of State Condolezza Rice two days earlier.25 Their encounter in Brussels took place, on February 22. That was the same day that Frank McKenna was telling the media that Canada had already said "yes" to "missile defense." Talk about mixed messages. While Pettigrew was purportedly having a quiet, private encounter with Rice and supposedly passing along the message that Canada would say "no" to "missile defense," whatever that means, McKenna was publicly relaying a more-reassuring message to assuage "missile defense" advocates, both north and south of the Canada-U.S. border. Deflection from Huge, DND-Spending Increases February 23 was a busy day for the Liberal government. After many years of apparent "dithering," it finally proclaimed that Canada would unequivocally say "no" to "missile defense." That same day, the government revealed the details of their federal budget. The 2005 budget, which just barely squeaked through Parliament during a non-confidence vote on May 19, contained what the Liberal's described, in February, as "the largest increase in defence spending in 20 years - more than $12.8 billion over the next five years."26 However, all this extra money was just icing on the cake of the DND budget which now stands over $13 billion per year. Even before this new surge in military spending, the Canadian government was already among the "top 10 percent of military spenders" in the world. In recent years, this has placed Canada's military "close to the top of the world's 190-plus countries."27 However, thanks to this latest influx of riches into Canada's budget for war, the country will edge its way up even further into the prestigious club of the world's most generous military spenders. On budget day, Conservative MP Rick Casson, referring to the McKenna debacle, asked in parliament whether Canada's Minister of National Defence, Bill Graham, would resign over what Casson called the Liberal "flip-flop" on "missile defense." He said the government was "misleading Canadians" on its real "commitment" to the program by using a "deliberate sleight of hand" trick. Graham deflected this assault saying that the Conservatives"would not want me to resign before the budget this afternoon. I am looking forward to that far too much. I know all honourable members will rejoice with me in knowing that today is going to be a great day for national defence in Canada, a great day for the security of Canada for Canadians and a great day for the Liberal government."28 Graham was probably quite right, at least about the Conservative Party's support for the Liberal's display of over-the-top munificence towards the military. Only a year earlier, Conservative leadership hopefuls were falling all over themselves, at their Toronto convention, trying to outdo one another in their promises of generosity to the military. For instance, front-runner Stephen Harper said that under his rule, the Canadian government would spend an extra $1.2 billion per year on the military. For her part, high-profile billionaire Belinda Stronach, heir to Magna Corp., a Canadian export industry that used to sell small arms and still profits from lucrative military-vehicle contracts, vowed to give almost as much. She said Canada's military deserved an "extra $10 billion over the next 10 years."29 Stronach later astounded Canadians on May 17, just two days before the 2005 budget was expected to be defeated in a non-confidence vote. She abandoned the party that she had wanted to lead, and joining the Liberals. Her move changed the balance of power, allowed the budget to pass and got Stronach an immediate Cabinet post overseeing human resources and the government's "democratic renewal" process.30 The Liberal government's actual military-budget increases more than doubled the best offers mustered a year earlier by Stronach and Harper. Such overzealous Liberal-government military spending may lead some to wonder: Who needs Conservatives, when we have Liberals like these? However, despite such pro-military extravagance, the budget was met with very little criticism, even though Canadians generally place military spending far down their list of priorities, after health, education and the environment. Even the NDP and the peace/anti-war movement seemed to mute their criticism of the military's boost in fortunes. Why? Answering this question immediately brings us face-to-face once again with the gripping misconception that Canada is a "global peacekeeper." In particular, Canadians who dare speak out against military-spending increases always encounter the fervent and widespread belief that our troops are astoundingly underequipped. However, besides this perennial misperception, there was the matter of the budget's timing. Twinning the budget, with Martin's ostensible "no" to "missile defense," was an exceptionally well-crafted, public-relations coup. Even adversaries of the government have to feel a certain admiration for the Liberal's scientific skill at manipulating public opinion. Even outspoken opponents of "missile defense," within the NDP and the peace/anti-war movement, were so engaged in reacting to Martin's much-hyped "no" that attention was deflected away from the military's huge windfall. However, in practical terms, the Liberal's 13-billion dollar gift to the military had far more real significance than Martin's statement of opposition to "missile defense." And, ironically, the sizeable influx of new cash into Canada's military coffers will actually benefit various "missile defense"-related projects that DND has been harbouring in its books. Duplicity and Hypocrisy, as Usual A few days after the budget was announced, and Martin had issued his historic "no" to "missile defense," Minister Pettigrew stepped onto the stage once again, this time to inject some much-needed clarity into the nebulous meaning of Canada's professed opposition to "missile defense." On February 26, he was interviewed on the CBC-One radio program, "The House." His message must have been highly reassuring to all those Canadians who identify with, are supportive of, involved in, employed by or profiting from "missile defense"-related work in Canada. (See below, "Pettigrew Says Canada Open for 'Missile Defence' Business.") One could not imagine a statement that better epitomises the extreme hypocrisy and duplicity on peace issues that is regularly dished out by the Liberal government. Although "missile defense" undermines Canada's supposed support for disarmament at the UN, Pettigrew said Canada did not oppose America's pursuit of "missile defense." Canada, he said, is open for business on "missile defense." He even seemed insulted that the government might be expected to restrict the profit-seeking rights of Canadian firms. Through Pettigrew, the government talked from both sides of its mouth. To appeal to millions of voters opposed to so-called "missile defense," the Liberal solution was to create the outward appearance of taking a stance against this U.S.-led weapons program. Martin and company had long-pretended to "dither" on whether to "join." Then, Martin played his best hand by making a much-ballyhooed gesture designed to create the impression that the government had said "no" to U.S. pressure on "missile defense." Meanwhile, the Liberals had already given the go-ahead to "missile defense" and they were actually deepening their involvement through a variety of means including direct military-to-military links within NORAD, and through openness and support for all manner of corporate contracts. The Trap that some Call a Victory Although most Canadians are deeply suspicious of the U.S. plan to build what the media so-often calls a "missile defense shield," most are still unaware that, even setting aside Canada's commitment to "missile defense" through NORAD, their government, corporations, scientists and military forces have had a long-standing role in this massive, U.S.-led program to develop and improve advanced weapons systems. The first mistake was to accept the validity of the central question posed again and again by the corporate media: ""Should Canada get involved in missile defense?" By uncritically accepting this phony question, many in the peace movement abdicated their ability to expose the reality of Canada's existing involvement. Many activists worked so hard to spread the word to the media, politicians and the general public that Canada should not get involved in "missile defense," that the Canadian public became even more deeply entranced in the pleasant, but delusory, myth of this country's non-involvement. So, when Martin trumpeted the claim that Canada was "saying no" to the controversial weapons program, a sigh of relief was heard across the country. Not realising that Martin's "no" was a symbolic one with no bearing on Canada's already deeply-ingrained commitment to the missile scheme, Canadians largely embraced Martin's "no" at face value and gave it much more practical significance than it really deserved. This trusting response was equally true of many peace activists. For several years, Canada's peace/anti-war movement had focused tremendous efforts on opposing the "missile defense" weapons program. Realising all-too-well that such work often goes unappreciated, it is with great reluctance that I offer even well-intentioned, constructive criticism. However, if our movement is to grow in effectiveness, we must be willing to debate our successes and our failures. With this hope, and with the greatest respect for friends and colleagues throughout our movement, I feel compelled to draw attention to a trap into which we have fallen. Tens of thousands of concerned Canadians wrote letters to newspaper editors and politicians, to sign petitions, to hold educational events and to march in protests opposing "missile defense." Many of these commendable actions were, however, marred because they overtly stated their goal in terms of trying to prevent Canada from becoming an accessory to the massive, U.S. weapons program known as "missile defense." This, of course, belied the commonly-held assumption that Canada was not already involved. Like most Canadians, peace activists have yet to appreciate that their country is playing several essential parts in so-called "missile defense." As a result, as soon as Martin uttered his famous "no," many activists sprang into action, circulating thousands of congratulatory emails, posting "We Win!" messages on their websites, holding celebratory parties, telling the media that they were drinking champagne and then soliciting funds from supporters for their supposedly, "well-informed" campaigns that had so successfully stopped the government from joining "missile defense." The negative effects of accepting the Liberal government's propaganda at face value have been manifold. Not only did the peace movement's response serve to concretise the already-widespread public misperception that Canada was "missile defense"-free, it also lent the peace movement's good name and credibility to the Liberal government, which has been the main promoter and financier of so many Canadian-led "missile defense" programs. Although the Liberals have expressed no intention whatsoever of dismantling any of the mulitfarious "missile defense" support systems that they have so-carefully constructed over the years, many in the peace movement were put in the extremely compromising position of supporting the government for its deceptive stance on "missile defense." Unfortunately, this response to the government's trickery actually sabotaged the ongoing need for a prolonged struggle to withdraw Canada from its already-sizable participation in "missile defense" programs. The mistaken impression that the "battle" to prevent Canada from joining "missile defense," is now over because we have "won," stopped the growing momentum of opposition that had been built up by the Canadian peace movement over many years. That momentum has now ground to a halt. It was an absolutely brilliant trap set by the Liberal government. Now that Canadians had been handed a symbolic "no," and the peace movement had celebrated its Pyrrhic victory, where does that leave those of us who wish to struggle against Canada's very real and long-standing role in "missile defense?" This struggle to withdraw Canada from its entanglement in the "missile defense" web of deceit is still very important. Although Canada is more deeply involved in "missile defense" than ever before, its role is now more effectively cloaked and hidden. Because of the unskeptical willingness to believe the Liberal government's subterfuge and eagerness to claim a success, activist's efforts to stop Canada's ongoing role in "missile defense" must now begin virtually from scratch. Why would the public now join a campaign to end Canada's complicity in "missile defense"? People have been successfully duped into believing the lie that Canada was never involved. What's more, with Martin's "no," the government is now seen as committed to stopping any future involvement. To make matters worse, the mistaken impression left on the public by the media, and even some naïve elements within the peace movement, is that Martin said "no" because he is so responsive to "well-informed public opinion." This blind faith in the Liberal government's democratic nature, conveys the wildly-mistaken belief that Martin and his party can be trusted to follow the thoughtful lead of the peace movement, rather than the priorities of their real allies in the corporate world. Such false hopes for the Liberal Party have often dragged down the peace movement's ambitions. In reality, both the Liberal and Conservative Parties are inextricably linked in a thousand ways to the corporate world. Both parties will use whatever Machiavellian contrivances they can muster to serve their real masters. Hypocrisy, duplicity and the doling out of pseudo-victories are standard devices in the toolkit of such political hucksters. If we as a peace movement give credibility to the erroneous belief that the powerful leadership controlling the Liberal Party is our ally, and that it will work with us to forge a new Canada that stands against profiting from war, then we are hopelessly naïve and co-opted. The Liberals and Conservatives draw their leaders from the same corporate pool. They divide between them the lion's share of support from Canada's powerful business elite, including those that benefit from war. So, regardless of which party gains electoral power, this same elite always wins. By unreservedly praising wily government public-relations gestures, like the clever pretence of opposing "missile defense," we ignore that this contrivance was cynically undertaken to win voters' support and confidence. By doing so, we also ignore the many back-room deals that continue to draw Canada deeper and deeper into a morass of weapons programs that deplete our public treasury in order to enrich the coffers of war privateers. Such innocent acceptance of the government's deliberate ploys to deceive will only help to prolong Canada's position as one of the world's top military spenders and exporters. And, it will only serve to continue Canada's position as a prominent team-player in the euphemistically-labelled program to build a "missile defense shield." References 1. Letter from Canadian Ambassador to the U.S., Michael Kergin, to U.S. Sec. of State, Colin Powell, August 5. www.fac-aec.gc.ca/department/note_0095-en.asp 2. Letter from Minister Pratt to Secretary Rumsfeld, January 15, 2004. www.forces.gc.ca/site/Focus/Canada-us/letter_e.asp 3. Reply from Secretary Rumsfeld to Minister Pratt. www.forces.gc.ca/site/Focus/Canada-us/letter_e.asp 4. Letter from Kergin to Powell, op. cit. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Letter from Colin Powell to Michael Kergin, to August 5 (JLAB-0095) www.fac-aec.gc.ca/department/note_0095-en.asp 8. Ernie Regehr, "BMD, NORAD and Canada-U.S. Security Relations," Ploughshares Monitor, Spring 2004. www.ploughshares.ca/content/BRIEFINGS/brf044.html 9. Canada - U.S. Defence Relations www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/defence/ca_us_relation_e.htm 10. "Exchange of Notes between Canada and the U.S. to Extend the NORAD Agreement for a further five-year period," Canado-American Treaties. www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca_us/en/cts.1996.36.en.html 11. Ernie Regehr, op. cit. 12. David Pugliese, "Canadian Military seeks Star Wars role," Ottawa Citizen, February 3, 1999. 13. John Clearwater, "Little Lost Canadians," Winnipeg Free Press, Mar. 3 2005. www.winnipegfreepress.com/west view/story/2610444p-3026697c.html 14. Ernie Regehr, op. cit. 15. O. Ward, "Bush call on missiles 'political posturing,'" Toronto Star, February 2, 2005. Cited by Ernie Regehr, "Reviewing BMD Options and Implications for Canada," February 2005. www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/BRIEFINGS/brf051.pdf 16. Beth Duff-Brown, "Envoy missile defense remarks spark uproar," Associated Press, February 22, 2005. 17. "Ottawa embarrassed over anti-missile shield comment," Agence France-Press, February 22, 2005. canada.news.designerz.com/ottawa-embarrassed-over-anti-missile-shield-comment.html?d20050222 18. "Martin will reject missile defence: report," Ballistic Missile Defence, CBC News Online, Feb. 24, 2005. www.cbc.ca/news/background/us_missiledefence 19. "Canada already onboard U.S. missile defence: McKenna," Canadian Press, February 22, 2005. 20. House of Commons Debate, Hansard, February 23, 2005. www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/063_2005-02-23/han063_1440-E.htm 21. David Ljunggren, "Canada Will Not Join U.S. Missile Defense System," Reuters, February 23, 2005. www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0223-07.htm 22. Cognitive Dissonance www.learningandteaching.info/learning/dissonance.htm 23. "Martin will reject missile defence: report," CBC News, February 23, 2005. 24. Oliver Moore, "Canada refuses further role in missile defence," Globe and Mail, February 24, 2005. peaceandjustice.org/article.php? story=20050224112706426&mode 25. Ibid. 26. Meeting our Global Responsibilities, Budget 2005, Dep't of Finance Canada. www.fin.gc.ca/budget05/pamph/parespe.htm 27. Ernie Regehr, "Canada's military spending higher than in WWII, but humanitarian aid has dropped," Catholic New Times, July 4, 2004. www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0MKY/is_12_28/ai_n6102271 28. House of Commons Debate, op. cit. 29. Murray Brewster, "Stronach would spend billions more on military," Canadian Press, March 16, 2004. www.canada.com/national/features/conservativeconvention 2004/story.html?id=91c3f468-248d-4081-af00-4b3537846f8c 30. "Belinda Stronach stuns political observers by defecting to Liberals," Cdn Press, May 17, 2005. www.canada.com/national/nationalpost/news/story.html?id= 6686e4e5-ba7f-47b6-a42e-5cfe68139918 [Proofreader's note: this article was edited for spelling and typos on August 4, 2005]

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