Bomb Threat, Danger, And Corporate Chaos At B.C. Ferries

Responsibility for that action rests with CEO David Hahn. The Gordon Campbell/Hahn attack on B.C. Ferries, and the rush to sell-off routes and services as secretly as possible doesn’t leave room for embarrassments or what management might see as “glitches” (like bomb threats which disrupt service). B.C. Ferries, for instance, has just appointed a new director in charge of “Alternate Service Delivery”, for which read “privatized ferry operations on the coast”. And B.C. Ferries Director of Communications, Ann Carpenter, at the Northern Sunshine Coast Ferry Advisory Committee meeting in Powell River on November 17, let slip that , in effect, the sell-out policy for the region would be finalized and then presented to the public for “consultation”! Bomb threats to Ferry terminals might convince British Columbians - more solidly than ever - that B.C. Ferries should remain a public company. And for all we know, Hahn took counsel with Kevin Falcon, Minister of Transportation, and Gordon Campbell before the insane handling of the bomb threat. If he did consult with members of Cabinet, we must know. But whether or not, the buck stops at David Hahn. What were the orders – orders that appear to have taken altogether too long to be presented to the crews of ferry vessels? The orders were to keep quiet and not inform passengers before loading, to load them aboard ship, and then – at sea – to make covert search for bombs; and/ or to remain quiet about the threat, deliver passengers to destination, and THEN search the ship. Other irresponsible directions may have been given. Here’s how one crew member put it. “I read up on bomb threats last night, and nowhere did it mention the new procedure: in an event of a bomb threat, fill the ship with passengers and get it as far from land as possible”. All the actions are placed in question anyway, because a suspiciously serious time lapse was apparently permitted between the time management was informed and any action was ordered to be taken. What more do we know? Before itemizing those things, you need to know why the public - about to board ferry vessels involved in the bomb threat - were not informed (b) why crew members were given irresponsible orders (c) and why you may not have heard of the bomb threat until now. When B.C. Ferries was “privatized” (April 2003) in one of the biggest smoke-and-mirrors manipulations of a publicly owned corporation in Canadian economic history, the Act prepared the new entity for just such an event as a bomb threat that could be kept secret. First, it removed the employees from any contact with the B.C. Labour Relations Board and cut them off as much as possible from freedom of speech. It did that, as well, by placing B.C. Ferries outside the reach of both B.C.’s Access to Information laws and the B.C. Ombudsman. (Any employee who spoke publicly about negative actions of the new managers could be leaned on, individually, without normal recourse. And rumour is that some have been) Secondly, because of the above, the David Hahn bosses could be fairly confident the public would not learn about the bomb threat or the inadequate, highly dangerous response of senior Ferry management. Thirdly, you have not heard about the bomb threat in the normal way, through press releases and public discussion because B.C. Ferries, a private corporation, obviously believes that if you have knowledge that you have a right to have, B.C. Ferries might not make as much money as it plans to make. That appears to be precisely what happened at the time of the bomb threat. B.C. ferries denied to passengers waiting to be loaded on vessels the knowledge that a bomb threat had been reported and vessels had not been cleared of the threat. Or B.C. Ferries carried passengers on a ship under threat and did nothing until arriving at port, off-loading the passengers, and THEN clearing the vessel of the threat. As I have said, even those steps seem to have been taken only some hours after the communication of the threat – during which time all ships could, I believe, have been cleared in port, before loading. Possibly, B.C. Ferry management did not do that for fear a short (15 to 30 minute) delay might (a) alarm passengers, or (b) involve the corporation in some small loss of money. What we know: - B.C. Ferries was notified of the threat by the RCMP. - Terminals were mentioned but ships were not mentioned specifically. - The alert was, apparently, received near to 10:00 a.m. - The information communicated was of a “Code G” threat. - In some cases the information was not, it seems, communicated to ships crews for hours. - In at least one case, and perhaps more, crews were told to load the vessel with passengers, go to sea, and then conduct a Code G search. - Some of the ships involved, though not all, were the Spirit of Vancouver, Queen of Surrey, Burnaby, Skeena, Coquitlam, and Cumberland. There can be no question whatever that passengers waiting at a terminal should have been given complete information about the nature of the bomb threat so they could choose to board or to delay boarding until a later sailing. That is the primary fact. But let us suppose a body of private corporation managers doesn’t want to fulfill its responsibilities to the public for fear doing so would affect the financial bottom line. They might, in that case, smoke-screen a boarding delay of 15 to 30 minutes, search the ships, and then permit boarding. That is an imperfect and dangerous second-best. But the David Hahn management didn’t even take that disguised precaution. As anyone knows who follows public statements by U.S citizen CEO of B.C. Ferries David Hahn, he claims over and over that the first priority of the New B.C. Ferries is safety, the second is service. He has said those things over and over. David Hahn must go.