"Deep Integration"—The Anti-Democratic Expansion Of NAFTA

What is the Security and Prosperity Partnership? From its origins in Waco, the SPP has developed through several formal meetings, including a March 31, 2006 meeting of heads of state in Cancun, a ministerial meeting in Canada in February of this year, and a secret meeting of high-level government, military, and business people in Banff in September of 2006, which was outed by Canadian civil society watchdogs. The official U.S. web page describes the SPP as: "... a White House-led initiative among the United States and the two nations it borders—Canada and Mexico—to increase security and to enhance prosperity among the three countries through greater cooperation. The SPP is based on the principle that our prosperity is dependent on our security and recognizes that our three great nations share a belief in freedom, economic opportunity, and strong democratic institutions. The SPP outlines a comprehensive agenda for cooperation among our three countries while respecting the sovereignty and unique cultural heritage of each nation." The definition reveals important aspects of the "partnership" while hiding others. The fact that it is "White House-led" is beyond doubt. When the heads of state met in Waco and in subsequent meetings to follow up on NAFTA, both Canada and Mexico had some very serious concerns. Canada was embroiled in trade conflicts with the United States (soft lumber, beef) that it wanted to see resolved in the context of cooperation supposedly embodied in NAFTA. The stark contradiction between open borders for merchandise and criminalization of immigrants had led over the decade-plus of NAFTA to an untenable position for Mexico's rightwing government. On the one hand, it had a commitment to greater integration under the free trade model; on the other it was under tremendous political pressure to defend Mexicans migrating to the United States. None of these issues made it into the SPP. Instead, the trinational agenda was hijacked by U.S. security concerns, and corporate demands for fewer obstacles to border-hopping production and sales. From the outset, the "deep integration" proposed under the SPP was indeed White House-led and highly selective in what (and who) it included in its purview. The SPP is not a law, or a treaty, or even a signed agreement. All these would require public debate and participation of Congress, both of which the SPP has scrupulously avoided. And yet "the dialogue" seeks to make trilateral decisions of the executive branch and business binding to the point of modifying national regulations in all three countries involved. The SPP has a surprising amount of official trappings for a non-agreement. In addition to a U.S. webpage (http://spp.gov/), it has a Myths vs. Facts page (in response to criticisms), a ministerial council, annual meetings and progress reports, working groups, documents, recommendations and, purportedly, "a vision." Over the past two years since its debut, it has acquired a trilateral dynamic, regulatory authority and strategic importance, especially to the United States. Because of the lack of transparency surrounding this process, it takes some serious digging to reveal the strategy embodied in the SPP. A few key documents serve as a basis. One is the Council on Foreign Relations 2005 paper "Building a North American Community" which states the need for foreign investment in Mexico's petroleum sector, common external tariffs, access to resources for the private sector, and greater labor mobility, among other things. Another is the 2007 report of the North American Competitiveness Council. These reports cannot be seen as blueprints however. First, they must pass through the political screen of the White House. The 2005 recommendation for full labor mobility by 2010 may be a logical step but cannot pass that filter and make it onto the SPP agenda. http://americas.irc-online.org/am/4276

Note: http://spp.gov/ http://americas.irc-onl...