Relying on a smile and a nine-millimetre Glock handgun, she patrols with her local partners -- fresh recruits from the discredited Royal Solomon Islands Police. Hunched in a rickety cruiser, they begin a bone-jarring sweep through "Borderland," the deadliest district in this ramshackle capital.
Despite the threats, most residents of this dirt-poor island chain look upon the strapping Australian men and women in blue as saviours.
Two years ago, these outsiders rescued the islanders from themselves -- from the chaos of a failed state riven by ethnic cleansing and gang violence culminating in the government's collapse. In fact, Kleehammer is one of 300 foot soldiers in an Australian experiment that has redefined her government's approach to global trouble spots. The police deployment is the centrepiece of a massive, decade-long intervention launched in mid-2003 with an amphibious landing by 1,700 combat troops.
As they restored order, the $1 billion operation was bolstered by squads of elite civil servants reviving the moribund machinery of government, ranging from treasury economists to customs agents patrolling the airport. It is a virtual takeover of a sovereign country -- albeit by invitation. The Solomon Islands rescue mission has served as the inspiration for an equally ambitious police deployment in Papua, New Guinea -- another crime-infested, corruption-ridden troublespot off Australia's northern coast.
Saving the day is becoming a habit for Australians. The federal police have set up an "international deployment division" as part of its "core business," says Will Jamieson, who ran the division before relocating here to run the Solomon Islands police mission. Australia's biggest and boldest intervention came in late 1999, when its military deployed decisively into nearby East Timor as it was struggling for independence from adjacent Indonesia in mid-1999. While Western countries stood by paralyzed, the global spotlight was shining on 5,700 Australian troops as they stared down Indonesian-backed militiamen.
Today, Australia projects its power from Iraq and Afghanistan in the West, to the Solomon Islands and other South Pacific nations in the East. Beyond the sheer sweep of territory, Australia's increasingly muscular and activist strategy suggests a country that is punching far above its weight. Bruised by the 2002 Bali bombing that claimed 88 Australian lives and left the country reeling, it emerged more determined to ally itself with Washington's war on terror.
An early clue to Australia's inclinations came when Prime Minister John Howard famously agreed with an interviewer that he was America's "deputy sheriff" in the region; he created an even bigger stir by threatening pre-emptive strikes against terrorists plotting against Australians from neighbouring countries. But Australia's influence is about more than muscle and sabre-rattling. Australians beat the rest of the world to the punch by donating a remarkable $1 billion within hours of last December's tsunami, and sending in the first waves of military rescue teams.
Compared to Canada -- with a similarly modest population and compact military -- Australia is emerging as a global player and diplomatic powerhouse. It is often said that there no two countries more similar than Canada and Australia in terms of size and British parliamentary traditions, but on defence and foreign policy the two countries are following distinctly different paths.
While Canada concentrates on peacekeeping and emphasizes multilateralism, Australia opts for rapid responses to shore up failing states -- even without United Nations approval. Canada proudly wears its multilateral memberships on its sleeve and heralds the United Nations as the foundation of its foreign policy, while Australia's government is openly dismissive of Security Council consultations that go nowhere.
http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2005/august/17/sheriff/
[Proofreader's note: this article was edited for spelling and typos on August 22, 2005]
Note: http://www.embassymag.c...
Australia, America's "Deputy Sheriff," Punches Above Its Weight And Cr
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Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, and the intergovernmental <br />
process being developed to promote its key findings, has provided a catelyst for consideration <br />
of a critically important question: how should the international community respond to serious <br />
humanitarian crises involving the potential for large scale loss of life, such as genocide?<br />
<br />
While civil society organizations were consulted in the development of the ICISS Report,<br />
the consultation process summarized below was among the first to bring the Report back<br />
to NGOs, academics and others to hear their views on its contents. This was also one of<br />
the first opportunities for widespread discussion of the potential involvement of civil<br />
society in promoting and operationalizing the Report. Through a variety of outreach<br />
mechanisms, the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP) has<br />
attempted to draw out the views of organizations and individuals from all regions with<br />
expertise in these areas.<br />
<br />
As a point of departure, there was a strong emphasis among all those consulted on the<br />
critical need for the international community to become better prepared to respond to<br />
emerging conflicts involving the potential for large scale loss of life. Unfortunately,<br />
there is consensus around the inevitability of future crises of the magnitude of Rwanda,<br />
Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo, and so many others, giving rise to a general appreciation<br />
of the ICISS Report and its role in getting these issues back on the table. The current<br />
international political climate is considered to be a strong hindrance to this agenda, yet<br />
this is not viewed as a reason to refuse to examine these critical questions.<br />
<br />
The inter-governmental process to promote and operationalize the key concepts in the<br />
ICISS Report among sovereign nations was explained during this consultation process. It<br />
involves two key aspects. The first is operational, focusing in particular on having the<br />
Security Council refer in its work to the key aspects of the Report as well as other<br />
documents that set out the commitments of UN Member States to prevent conflict and<br />
protect civilians. The second aspect of the work emphasizes normative development, in<br />
particular the concept that sovereign nations have responsibilities as well as rights,<br />
including the ‘Responsibility to Protect.’ The ultimate goal is deeper engagement by the<br />
Security Council and by sovereign states in response to emerging crises that meet the<br />
threshold in the ICISS Report.<br />
<br />
Civil society representatives consulted overwhelmingly held the view that while the<br />
development of norms is very important, this process must be allowed sufficient time to<br />
evolve. The clear response was that the codification of norms should be a long-term<br />
goal. Nevertheless, it was emphasized that the time does not appear ripe to move towards<br />
the development of principles for military intervention. There was also agreement that<br />
many commitments have already been made by governments to respond earlier and more<br />
appropriately to emerging crises and thus the short-term goal must be to ensure adherence<br />
to these commitments.<br />
<br />
Throughout the consultation process, all individuals with whom WFM-IGP discussed the<br />
ICISS Report expressed general support for its contribution to this critical debate. Strong<br />
support emerged in particular for the general principles and framework of the ICISS<br />
Report. Nevertheless, important critiques and reservations were also expressed about<br />
specific points or omissions. Others focused their comments not on genuine critiques of<br />
the content of the Report, but on concerns that it is relatively easy to achieve agreement<br />
on paper about basic principles and extremely difficult to reach consensus on their<br />
application. Interestingly, participants in several meetings raised the possibility that the<br />
Responsibility to Protect could be applied to other areas as well.<br />
<br />
The current international political climate was inevitably the focal point of much of the<br />
discussion about challenges and opportunities, particularly in light of the on-going ‘war<br />
on terrorism’ and the start of the war in Iraq during this consultation process. Concerns<br />
focused on the potential of the agenda of the ICISS Report to be highjacked, the<br />
complication of the question of the legitimate use of force by “coalitions of the willing”,<br />
the effect of anti-terrorism measures on the ability of NGOs to fulfill their mandates, etc.<br />
Other key concerns related to civil society skepticism about the potential of all<br />
governments to put aside national self-interest to embrace this agenda, and realistic<br />
questions about the true capacity of governments and inter-governmental bodies to<br />
respond to emerging crises even where political will exists. Challenges in getting civil<br />
society’s attention to these issues were also highlighted, with the most important relating<br />
to mandates preventing a call for military intervention. Nevertheless, opportunities within<br />
both the inter-governmental and civil society communities were also highlighted, with the<br />
bottom line being the imperative to find a way to address key challenges.<br />
<br />
Several tracks of potential NGO involvement in these issues emerged from the<br />
consultation process. The first relates to the promotion of norms. This would be focused<br />
at all levels, including the United Nations and other international organizations, regional<br />
and sub-regional inter-governmental bodies, individual governments and civil society<br />
organizations. The norms would include the moral imperative for the international<br />
community to respond to an emerging situation of the type envisaged in the ICISS<br />
Report; the change in terminology from “a right of humanitarian intervention” to a<br />
“responsibility to protect”; the continuum of appropriate responses from prevention to<br />
reaction to rebuilding; the priority of preventive measures; and perhaps the need for<br />
principles for military intervention. It should be noted that the latter remains controversial<br />
among both governments and NGOs and will need to evolve slowly through appropriate<br />
consultation and consideration in both communities.<br />
<br />
The second track would focus on creating the political will for early and appropriate<br />
responses by governments as situations emerge, and for other options, up to and<br />
including military intervention, to be considered where these measures fail. In this regard,<br />
it is important to note that there is a substantial amount of important work already being<br />
undertaken by organizations and networks that are following and impacting the work of<br />
the United Nations and individual governments on the prevention of conflict and<br />
protection of civilians agendas. These include, among others: the NGO Security Council<br />
Working Group; the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security; the Watch<br />
List on Children and Armed Conflict; Global Action to Prevent War; the Steering<br />
Committee on Humanitarian Response; Amnesty International; CARE International;<br />
Global Policy Forum; Human Rights Watch; Oxfam International, and several others.<br />
Any additional efforts on these issues would need to build on and add value to this<br />
important work.<br />
<br />
The third and final track would involve advocating for the strengthened capacity of<br />
individual governments and inter-governmental bodies at all levels to implement the<br />
commitments they have made on this agenda.<br />
<br />
At the same time, the consultation process resulted in the identification of some of the<br />
challenges for NGOs working to promote meaningful action in response to emerging<br />
conflict. While many organizations are highly involved in the operational side of the<br />
prevention of conflict and protection of civilians, fewer are able to engage in advocacy<br />
roles. This is limited to a great extent by lack of human and financial resources, lack of<br />
access to decision-makers, lack of knowledge of the most effective ways of influencing<br />
the agenda of governments on these issues, gaps in coordination between those working<br />
at the United Nations and those with regional and national expertise, and gaps in<br />
information, particularly for NGOs with limited UN access.<br />
<br />
At several meetings, the possibility of creating an NGO network on these issues was<br />
raised, and this is something which requires further consideration and discussion. One<br />
possibility raised is to create an NGO Human Security Network to work in parallel with<br />
the inter-governmental network. At one of the roundtable discussions participants took<br />
the time to discuss the potential mandate, composition and role of any network that<br />
emerged. Many emphasized that civil society organizations already play many important<br />
operational roles with respect to parts of this agenda and said there is no pressing need to<br />
ensure closer cooperation on the NGO operational side. Thus the key would be to<br />
facilitate and support efforts to hold governments accountable, again bearing in mind the<br />
need to support and enhance the consideration efforts already being undertaken.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org/civilsociety.pdf">http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org/civilsociety.pdf</a><br />
<br />
Bush rejected this proposal promoted by then Prime Minister Jean Chretien. President Bush was at the time trying to gather support for the invasion of Iraq at the time. <br />
<p>---<br>Perception is two thirds of what we perceive reality to be.<br />
<br />
Difficult decisions are a privilege of rank.<br />
The contrast with Canada, which prides itself on being a "middle power" that absented itself from Iraq, is inescapably unflattering. Despite significant domestic opposition -- the country is still split on the issue -- Australia didn't hesitate to send troops during the U.S.-led invasion and now has about 400 soldiers in Iraq. It is also sending more soldiers to Afghanistan, again. Nor did it wait for UN approval before dispatching forces to the Solomon Islands, fearing a Security Council veto by China.
"The political will comes from a commitment to try to make a contribution to dealing with some of the world's problems," Downer says. "Sometimes we can do it alone -- at least lead the operation, as we did in East Timor," he continues. "We did the heavy lifting. Same in the Solomon Islands. With Papua New Guinea we do it alone with the PNG government."
Australians are unabashed about flexing their muscle. "We're all very proud to be punching above our weight," says Susan Windybank, head of foreign policy research at Sydney's Centre for Independent Studies. "We don't want our backyard to become a junkyard."
The risk, however, is that Australia is stretching itself thin while trying too hard to please the Americans, says Owen Harries, a foreign policy advisor to previous Australian governments.
Despite his skepticism of Australia's over-arching ambition to be in the big leagues, Harries is contemptuous of Canada's more cautious foreign policy. "I don't admire Canada's foreign policy very much. For a country of its weight, it should be doing more than engaging in good works."
I can only take from that comment that he'd like to see us doing some "evil" works too, like maybe participating in wars of aggression and other international crimes?
He needn't worry. Look at our illegal and immoral action in Haiti.
Well now let see when was the last time we saw the Aussies leading the pack with a capable aggressor?
Vietnam? No they left after the French and before the Americans? No, No they were just a bunch of peasant farmers. Yeah that’s it. Well you got me?
As for Canada, well it only did what the U.S. wanted, to stay out of their business of defending North America and fighting Russian Communism, now they have changed tracks so it time to blame the wiping boy. You are right about one thing we should have maintained our Military might, told the Americans to stick peace keeping, to stay out of our business and to look after their own borders!
<br />
The following lists detail the Victoria Cross recipients by nationality.<br />
• List of American Victoria Cross recipients ... 5 awards <br />
• List of Australian Victoria Cross recipients ... 96 awards <br />
• List of Belgian Victoria Cross recipients ... 1 award <br />
• List of Canadian Victoria Cross recipients ... 90 awards <br />
• List of Ceylonese Victoria Cross recipients ... 1 award <br />
• List of Danish Victoria Cross recipients ... 4 awards <br />
• List of English Victoria Cross recipients ... 615 awards (incomplete) <br />
• List of Fijian Victoria Cross recipients ... 1 awards <br />
• List of German Victoria Cross recipients ... 2 awards <br />
• List of Grenadan Victoria Cross recipients ... 1 award <br />
• List of Indian Victoria Cross recipients ... 29 awards <br />
• List of Irish Victoria Cross recipients ... 190 awards <br />
• List of Kenyan Victoria Cross recipients ... 1 award <br />
• List of Nepalese Victoria Cross recipients ... 11 awards <br />
• List of New Zealander Victoria Cross recipients ... 24 awards <br />
• List of Newfoundlander Victoria Cross recipients ... 1 award <br />
• List of Rhodesian Victoria Cross recipients ... 3 awards (incomplete) <br />
• List of Scottish Victoria Cross recipients ... 158 awards (incomplete) <br />
• List of Sikkimese Victoria Cross recipients ... 1 award <br />
• List of South African Victoria Cross recipients ... 20 awards (incomplete) <br />
• List of Swedish Victoria Cross recipients ... 1 award <br />
• List of Swiss Victoria Cross recipients ... 1 award <br />
• List of Ukrainian Victoria Cross recipients ... 1 award <br />
• List of Welsh Victoria Cross recipients ... 25 awards (incomplete) <br />
• List of West Indian Victoria Cross recipients ... 3 awards (incomplete)<br />
<br />
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Victoria_Cross_recipients_by_nationality">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Victoria_Cross_recipients_by_nationality</a><br />
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