[e.p.1]

The Assange affair is fascinating (to me) for a number of reasons.

That a single man untutored in politics has been able to "upset the teakettle" of our world's most powerful nation (and its "running dogs") to the extent that he has ... is astounding.

Less astounding is the action that that nation is well along towards completing: paralysing the "troublemaker", and spinning a shroud around him and his wikileaks.

A week ago, he argued before the UK supreme court against his extradition to the hands of a Swedish prosecutor for questioning.
The unstated subtext of his argument is that as soon as Sweden has him, they'll (may I say?) "rendition him" to the tender mercies of Gov-USA.

But Assange's formal argument is fascinating: that it is clear British law that a British court will extradite only after its approval of an application by a foreign COURT. Such is not the case here: the application has been submitted only by a Swedish prosecutor.
Authority of prosecutors to extradite from state to state seems to be accepted in the European Community. And British courts have on occasion, set aside British law and extradited on such prosecutorial authority.
The fascination here: given the subtext (apprehended rendition), will the supreme court set aside British law in this case and extradite (?)
The issue is more elegantly discussed here:
<http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/3814812.html>

A recent interview of Assange's mother is worth reading because it puts some simple facts clearly. See: <http://www.support-julian-assange.com/christine-assange-more-to-julians-extradition-case-than-media-reveals/#more-8437>

"The Most Dangerous Man in the World" (Fowler, 2011) is (I think) written objectively, and it offers further fascination. Looking at the struggle for superiority in secrecy (Assange vs. Gov-USA), Fowler analyses the challenge. Both sides have much to gain by penetrating the other's secrecy; and equally much to lose by being penetrated. What appears to be a daunting challenge: the more one "hardens" one's secrecy, the less free the flow of communication between the members of one's own (very large) team.

e.p.1

[Brent Swain]

When the US threatened internet control , hackers retaliated by shutting down the US justice department's computers. 'Screw with us ,and we screw with you" was the message. We all have the potential to give them payback.
The US govt backed down quickly .

[e.p.1]

@brent:

Glad to see your reply.

I didn't say why I posted. But it was essentially to invite discussion of the way wealth/power/influence (wpi) behave relative to your principle: "Screw with us, and we screw with you".
So I thank you. That's very helpful.

In my view, Gitmo, rendition, torture (and you can add lots more to the list) are examples of the way wpi applies your principle: "screw with us, and there is nothing" we won't do to you".
I would say this is the primary lesson I take from history. Examples abound in all of history.

"Judicial discretion" in British law is an interesting concept. It imposes on justices there the responsibility of seeking truth wherever they are able (and I presume that includes whatever "obvious" truth resides in their own minds) in order to render wiser judgments.
(a minor comment: "judicial discretion" is conceived distinctly differently in US)

So the justices of the UK supreme court have the responsibility to consider what the possible covert intent is of Assange's extradition to Sweden. And to recognize that once Assange is subject to Swedish law, they will have lost all power to control what follows.

I will pray that the justices are well-intentioned. In which case, this bumpkin suggests they will say to the extradition request: "Nyet! However, your prosecutorial team may come and question Assange under British rules."

e.p.1