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<strong>Title: </strong> <a href="/article/235929583-emerson-says-oil-on-the-table-if-us-wants-to-renegotiate-nafta" target="_blank"></a>
<strong>Category:</strong> <a href="/topics/57-canadaus-relations" target="_blank">Canada-U.S. relations</a> <strong>Written By: </strong> <a href="/profiles/N Say" target="_blank">N Say</a> <strong>Date: </strong> Thursday, February 28 at 00:21<br><br> <p>Just what everyone on this site would want if the US wanted to renegotiate NAFTA, I presume</p><br><a href="/article/235929583-emerson-says-oil-on-the-table-if-us-wants-to-renegotiate-nafta">read more >></a> All your news belong to ME! Whahaha I eat news! | |
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Reverend Blair wrote: Is the rhetoric ill-considered? Well, there's a lot of evidence that NAFTA has hurt working people in all three countries and the main beneficiaries have been multi-national corporations. It has hurt high-paying manufacturing jobs and made effective environmental regulation difficult. Feel free to post the evidence, Blair. Not rhetoric, but three peer reviewed papers! Here's one "three peer reviewed" paper that argues otherwise. Quote: First, the FTA had no long-run effect on the Canadian employment rate which was 62 percent both in April 1988 and April 2002. Second, Canadian manufacturing employment has been more robust than in most OECD countries. ... Most commentators expected Canadian wages to fall in response to competition from lessunionized, less-educated workers in the southern United States. ...For all workers, the tariff concessions raised annual earnings. For example, the total FTA impact is a rise of 3 percent at both the industry level and the plant level. ... At the plant level, earnings rose for both production and non-production workers. At the industry level, earnings gains were concentrated among production workers. ... a 3 percent rise in earnings spread over 8 years will buy you more than a cup of coffee, but not at Starbucks. The important finding is not that earnings went up, but that earnings did not go down in response to competitive pressures from the U.S. South. ... unionization does not offer an explanation of modestly rising earnings. ... There is a presumption in the popular press that anything to do with globalization will worsen income inequality. It is thus reassuring that there is absolutely no evidence that the FTA worsened income inequality. http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~trefler/fta.pdf And here's another that demonstrates trade has had little effect on growing income inequality. Quote: International trade accounts for only a small share of growing income inequality and labor-market displacement in the United States. Lawrence deconstructs the gap in real blue-collar wages and labor productivity growth between 1981 and 2006 and estimates how much higher these wages might have been had income growth been distributed proportionately and how much of the gap is due to measurement and technical factors about which little can be done. While increased trade with developing countries may have played some part in causing greater inequality in the 1980s, surprisingly, over the past decade the impact of such trade on inequality has been relatively small. Many imports are no longer produced in the United States, and US goods and services that do compete with imports are not particularly intensive in unskilled labor. Rising income inequality and slow real wage growth since 2000 reflect strong profit growth, much of which may be cyclical, and dramatic income gains for the top 1 percent of wage earners, a development that is more closely related to asset-market performance and technological and institutional innovations rather than conventional trade in goods and services. The minor role of trade, therefore, suggests that any policy that focuses narrowly on trade to deal with wage inequality and job loss is likely to be ineffective. Instead, policymakers should (a) use the tax system to improve income distribution and (b) implement adjustment policies to deal more generally with worker and community dislocation. http://benmuse.typepad.com/custom_house ... r-blu.html And another Quote: The U.S. wage structure evolved across the last century: narrowing from 1910 to 1950, fairly stable in the 1950s and 1960s, widening rapidly during the 1980s, and “polarizing” since the late 1980s. We document the spectacular rise of U.S. wage inequality after 1980 and place recent changes into a century-long historical perspective to understand the sources of change. The majority of the increase in wage inequality since 1980 can be accounted for by rising educational wage differentials, just as a substantial part of the decrease in wage inequality in the earlier era can be accounted for by decreasing educational wage differentials. Although skill-biased technological change has generated rapid growth in the relative demand for more-educated workers for at least the past century, increases in the supply of skills, from rising educational attainment of the U.S. work force, more than kept pace for most of the twentieth century. Since 1980, however, a sharp decline in skill supply growth driven by a slowdown in the rise of educational attainment of successive U.S. born cohorts has been a major factor in the surge in educational wage differentials. Polarization set in during the late 1980s with employment shifts into high- and low-wage jobs at the expense of the middle leading to rapidly rising upper tail wage inequality but modestly falling lower tail wage inequality. http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13568 And another Quote: It appears that US trade today combines these two elements in proportions that are hard to disentangle, particularly at levels of disaggregation that allow for a sufficiently precise matching of products and the wages earned in producing them. At relatively high levels of aggregation the data indicate that manufactured imports overall, and even those from developing countries such as China, are concentrated in US manufacturing sectors which pay significantly higher than average US wages. This means that import displacement does not fall disproportionately on less skilled workers. While there has been considerable displacement from trade during this period, it has not increased wage inequality. At more disaggregated levels, however, the data suggests that goods imported from developing countries such as China are associated with relatively less skilled labor inputs and – judging by their unit values – qualitatively different from those produced by developed countries such as the US. This provides support for the view that much of this trade reflects more complete specialisation and as such does not result in either wage inequality or downward pressure on wages generally.
http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/524
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